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this fable. In such a model the parasite does not relate to the individual objects but to the
relationship between the objects: "someone has a relationship to someone or something
else. A third arrives who has no relationship to the people or the things but only relates to
their relation" (p. 109). Thus static or noise, orut( parasite in French, interrupts die rela-
tionship in sound or electronic messages yet the static has no significance for the individ-
ual parties to a communication, only to the communicative relationship.
To characterize any philosophical reflection in a few sentences is unsatisfactory; in the
case of Serres it is laughable because Serres builds his whole work out of complex verbal
play, much of which would be lost in any translation , and with a deliberately non-linear
movement, circling around various problems again and again but with different exam-
ples. Since most of these textual illustrations are literary (seventeen texts from La
Fontaine, two from Rousseau, a passage from the Odyssey, etc.) he casts a new light on the
structure of these stories — and he does treat them as stories by concentrating on the rela-
tions of characters, for the most part — in a way that should give a welcome shock par-
ticularly to readers of French neo-classical literature.
Serres is not easy reading, yet he is anything but dull . It is hard not to rethink familiar
texts after a brief plunge into Serres. The translation by Lawrence Schehr is generally
competent and gets across die main ideas. Strangely, the translator has solved some really
difficult problems, translations of puns and of the word families by which Serres proceeds,
but has fallen into simple traps of idiomatic French. The English reader should be
warned, for example, that the country rat is not "Broken himself by the
interruptions . . ." (p. 14). It is instead "Because he is not accustomed to these interrup-
tions." In another case, "I never thought that my peers and I were angels, but we were not
stupid enough ever to stop making war, ever to obtain a few moments of peace" (p. 139),
should be the opposite, "we are not stupid enough never to stop war, never to arrange
moments of peace." Yet despite errors of translation and typesetting, the reader will get a
reasonably good idea of Serres's thought. This is an important contribution to the
philosophical use of literary texts .
DartmouthCollegeJohn D. Lyons
Blake, Hegel and Dialectic, by David Punter; 268 pp. Atlantic
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982, $23.00.
According to David Punter, "Blake's dialectic and Hegel's share a number of crucial
features" (p. 11), making Hegel's Phenomenology the "closest parallel to [Blake's] work" (p.
17). By emphasizing progression through contraries, both Blake and Hegel transform the
dialectical tradition that they presumably inherit from Heraclitus, Giordano Bruno, and
Jakob Böhme, all of whom Punter analyzes in his opening chapter. Subsequent chapters
trace the similarities diat Punter finds among such works as the Phenomenology, The Mar-
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riage ofHeaven and Hell, and The Four Zoos. Although Punter calls his comparison of Blake
and Hegel "important and fruitful" (p. 255), I do not see that it tells us much that we did
not already know.
Punter waints not only to join Blake and Hegel but to separate them both from the
Romantic movement with which M. H. Abrams, Northrop Frye, and many others have
associated them. In Punter's view, "dialectic" serves a "double function" in Blake and
Hegel, allowing them to transcend die "logical and scientific formalism" that characterized
the Enlightenment and to counter die "subjectivistic," "mystical," "indulgent," "one-
sided," and "simple organicist assumptions" diat "romantics from Fichte to Keats"
endorse. Aldiough Blake, Hegel, and die Romantics all respond to "the political experi-
ence of the French Revolution and its aftermath" and to "the effects of industrialization"
(p. 253), only Blake and Hegel, in diis view, try to salvage reason and work instead of
crudely rejecting diem.
Punter concedes diat his portrait of the Romantics may be "partial" (p. 7), but in my
opinion it is worse than that. The generosity toward reason and work diat characterizes
Blake aind Hegel also appears in Coleridge, Keats, Wordsworth, Schelling, and the other
writers that Blake and Hegel ostensibly supersede. Punter's conclusions about Blake and
Hegel accordingly seem to me not wrong but trite. Aldiough these two share the hostility
toward positivism and subjectivism that Punter imputes to them, this antagonism puts
diem in a far from exclusive group mat includes most modernist writers as well as the
major English and German Romantics, all of whom argue that "reason should be neither
vaunted as final arbiter nor abandoned as repressive agent, but reassigned to its correct
place in the whole man" (p. 101).
Isolating Blake and Hegel (if possible) would require a closer look at them than Punter
takes here. From Punter's distant vantage point, complex terms such as Blake's "Ratio"
and Hegel's Verstand (p. 121), or Albion and Geist (p. 163), are simple equivalents, and
relating Blake to Hegel, or bodi writers to their surroundings, only involves translating
characters and imagery (e.g. , Blake's Ore and Urizen) into concepts (Hegel's "desire" and
"objectification") diat stand for "entire social configurations" (here, "the resumption of
alienated energy" and "creeping industrialization"). Similarly, from where Punter stands,
the Phenomenology, as "a work of philosophy which is yet not philosophy," illuminates
Blake's "evolution of new forms of writing," designed to "realize the unity of psychology,
history and teleology" (p. 17).
Although Punter occasionally acknowledges the "complexity" of the writers he
discusses, he is most often content to reduce them to die static abstractions ("alienated
energy," and so forth) and bland propositions that I have been citing. M. H. Abrams has
said that "wherever you engage with Hegel's thought, you find yourself in immediate
motion." Much the same can be said of Blake, whose characters, designs, and texts shift
and intermingle in a dizzying way that prevents us from calling Blake's work "writing,"
much less "poetry" or "philosophy." Although generalizations about Urizen, "objectifica-
tion," and "industrialization" may nevertheless complement detailed analysis, in Blake,
Hegel and Dialectic they substitute for it, turning a potentially important book into a tedious
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